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AND THE PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE IN
NAPOLEONIC ITALY , THE OPPIZZONI
AFFAIR , –*
AMBROG IO A. C A I AN I
University of Kent
A B S T R A C T . The recent bicentennial commemorations of the Napoleonic empire have witnessed a
proliferation of new studies. Scholars now possess much more sophisticated conceptual tools than
in past decades with which to gauge the problems faced by French imperial administrators throughout
Europe. Well-trodden concepts, like centre/periphery or collaboration/resistance, have been reinvigo-
rated by more sophisticated understandings of how rulers and ruled interacted in the early nineteenth
century. This article argues that, while much progress has been made in understanding problems of
‘resistance’, there is more to be said about the other side of the same coin, namely: ‘collaboration’.
Using the micro/local history of a scandal in Napoleonic Bologna, this article wishes to reafﬁrm
that collaboration was an active agent that shaped, and often shook, the French imperial project.
The biggest problem remained that, despite ‘good intentions’, collaborators sometimes simply did
not collaborate with each other. After all, imperial clients were determined to beneﬁt from the experience
of empire. The centre was often submerged by local petty squabbles. This article will use a speciﬁc
micro-history in Bologna to highlight the extent to which Napoleonic empire builders had to thread
a ﬁne line between the impracticalities of direct control and the dangers of ‘going native’.
I
The importance of the experience of Napoleonic rule for the history of Italy has
never been truly in doubt. The region was a vital component of the French
empire. It not only delivered vital resources in terms of revenue andmanpower
but, more importantly, its control bestowed geo-strategic security on the
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southern fringe of Europe. Despite this apparent dominance, the empire
struggled to swallow the peninsula whole and place it under direct control.
Italy’s landscape was heterogeneous with enormous social, cultural, and geo-
graphic diversities. The legacy of the ancien régime, and the manner in which
France conquered these territories, made uniﬁed administration difﬁcult to es-
tablish. Indeed, from , the population of Italy was divided and adminis-
tered in no fewer than three separate jurisdictions.
Northern-western Italy was part of metropolitan France, and received its
marching orders from Paris. As part of the départements réunis (or annexed
departments), Piedmontese, Ligurians, Tuscans, and later the inhabitants of
Lazio were placed under the direct control of an increasingly corpulent
French nation that had long burst out of its natural frontiers. The south,
after its conquest in , became a satellite kingdom ruled by
Napoleonides. Here, the thinly veiled illusion of autonomy was offset by aggres-
sive French domination. Paris sent bands of French military ofﬁcers, jurists,
spies, policemen, and ministers to drag the old kingdom of Naples into a
future that proved distinctly unwelcome to many locals. Essentially, for two-
thirds of Italians, the experience of French rule was one of subjugation,
where the light yoke of ancien régime princes had been exchanged for the
heavy and demanding hand of French cultural hegemony.
The situation in the northern and central corner of the peninsula, that is to
say the republic/kingdom of Italy, was very different. It has been deﬁned rightly
as ‘the jewel in the crown of Napoleon’s hegemony’. Its Lombard and Emilian
heartland was more urbanized than the rest of the peninsula, and contained
strong native traditions of municipal autonomy mingled together with an illu-
minist movement that rivalled France’s enlightenment. Napoleon had never
forgotten the generally good reception he had received in a large number of
Italian cities during his ﬁrst military campaign. The experience of generating
‘sister republics’ had given him an important apprenticeship in the arts of
 Michael Broers, Napoleonic imperialism and the Savoyard monarchy, –: state building
in Piedmont (New York, NY, ); and see also idem, The Napoleonic empire in Italy, –:
cultural imperialism in a European context (New York, NY, ).
 John Davis, Naples and Napoleon: southern Italy and the European revolutions, –
(Oxford, ); Albert Espitalier, Napoleon and King Murat (Tyne and Wear, ); and
Michel Lacour-Gayet, Joachim et Caroline Murat (Paris, ), pp. –.
 Milton Finley, The most monstrous of wars: the Napoleonic guerrilla war in southern Italy, –
 (Columbia, SC, ).
 Michael Broers, ‘A clash of enlightenments: judicial reform in the Napoleonic republic
and kingdom of Italy’, in Michael Broers, The Napoleonic Mediterranean (London, ).
 Carlo Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone (Turin, ); Domenico Sella and Carlo Capra, Il ducato
di Milano dal  al  (Turin, ), esp. pp. –; and Franco Venturi, Italy and the
Enlightenment (New York, NY, ), esp. chs. , , and .
 For the most recent descriptions, see Michael Broers, Napoleon: soldier of destiny (London,
), pp. –; and Philip Dwyer, Napoleon: the path to power, – (London,
), pp. –.
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government and politics. Himself the descendant of Ligurian adventurers, the
emperor had mixed feelings when it came to the land of his ancestors.
Italy remained both familiar, and infuriatingly remote, in a manner that no
other part of the empire ever could parallel. Germans, Poles, Spaniards, and
Croatians were authentically ‘other’ whereas Milanese and Bolognese elites
were troublesome cousins. This is why, to an extent unknown anywhere else,
in the empire Lombards and Emilians were given positions of authority as
ofﬁcers, ministers, prefects, and prelates. The efﬁcient, hardworking Eugène
de Beauharnais, viceroy of these lands, was told by his imperious stepfather to
listen to his Italian ministers, especially the formidable Prina. In contrast,
Louis Bonaparte in Holland was reminded constantly he was a French prince
and not a Dutch monarch. The republic and successor kingdom of Italy
were allowed ﬂexibilities that did not exist elsewhere in the empire.
For instance, the system of voting was different from that of France. It orga-
nized Italian notables into three electoral colleges divided to bestow represen-
tation on landowners, merchants, and the intelligentsia. The  Italian
Concordat enshrined the somewhat meaningless concession to the church
that Catholicism here, unlike in France, was a state religion. Equally, after
much quibbling, a separate (and cosmetically altered) code of criminal proced-
ure was bestowed on this province in . Unlike for other satellite realms,
the Italian ﬁrst minister Antonio Aldini and the kingdom’s foreign minister
Ferdinando Marescalchi resided in Paris. This was not a sign of subjugation
but highlighted that the emperor wished to have Italian opinion represented
in his capital and allowed these two ministers to lobby on behalf of their imper-
ial constituency. In the capital, they had unparalleled access to elite French
society and the imperial court. It should be noted that these autonomies were
‘ornamental’ rather than fundamental in nature. However, they do illustrate
that in Milan, more than anywhere else, the sensibilities of local elites were
 Michel Vergé-Franceschini, Napoléon: une enfance corse (Paris, ), pp. –, –;
Alain Pillepich, Milan, capitale napoléonienne, – (Paris, ), pp. –.
 Fondation Napoléon, Napoléon Bonaparte: correspondance générale ( vols., Paris, –),
No. , Milan  prairial an XIII  juin , V, pp. – (henceforth: Napoléon
Bonaparte, Correspondance générale); Albert Du Casse, Mémoires et correspondance politique et mili-
taire du Prince Eugène ( vols., Paris, –), I, pp. –; and Silivo Pellini, Giuseppe
Prina: ministro delle ﬁnanze del regno italico (Milan, ).
 Napoléon Bonaparte, Correspondance generale, No. , Osterode  mars , VII,
pp. –; and Annie Jourdan, ed. Louis Bonaparte, roi de Hollande (Paris, ), pp. –.
 Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone, pp. –; the constitution of Bayonne seems to have been
modelled on Italian electoral practices, cf. Pierre Conard, La constitution de Bayonne, :
essai d’édition critique (Paris, ), pp. –.
 Daniele Arru, Il Concordato italiano del  (Milan, ), pp. –.
 Melchiorre Roberti, Milano capitale napoleonica: la formazione di uno stato moderno, –
 ( vols., Milan, ), II, pp. –.
 Antonio Zanolini, Antonio Aldini ed i suoi tempi: narrazione storica con documenti inediti o poco
noti ( vols., Florence, ); and Teresa Muzzi, Vita di Ferdinando Marescalchi, patrizio bolognese
(Rome, ).
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taken seriously and attempts were made, at the very least, to spare their feelings.
This less piercing version of French imperial rule is something that scholars
have tended to overlook.
The latest interpretations from the ‘new Napoleonic history’ have argued that
the different cultural, administrative, and political reforms undertaken in Italy
were akin to a clash of civilizations.Michael Broers has borrowed the concepts
of ‘cultural imperialism’ and ‘orientalism’ from the literary critic Edward Said
to highlight the intolerance of the French empire builders toward their subject
peoples. This highly inﬂuential reinterpretation remains admirable in its goal
of placing the Napoleonic episode in its broadest possible comparative context
and analysing it with a number of well-chosen theoretical tools from neighbour-
ing disciplines. These studies, in particular, have underscored how the differ-
ent ancien régimes and political geographies, scattered throughout Europe, left in
the wake of their destruction a mixed inheritance. This determined both the
nature and limits of Napoleonic rule outside of metropolitan France.
Despite these new studies, scholars of Napoleonic Europe have tended to
neglect theoretical perspectives from imperial history on the thorny issue of
native elite ‘collaboration’. In a now classic article from , Ronald
Robinson presented a theoretical outline, whereby native collaborators on
the periphery were not mere pawns, but shaped the dynamics of empire.
This insight certainly speaks to the Napoleonic context, as the French empire
was exceedingly keen to promote partnerships with indigenous elites. In
doing this, it faced several headaches similar to those identiﬁed by Frederick
 Michael Broers, ‘Napoleon, Charlemagne, and Lotharingia: acculturation and the
boundaries of Napoleonic Europe’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –; Stuart Woolf,
‘French civilization and ethnicity in the Napoleonic empire’, Past and Present,  (),
pp. –; and for the most recent survey, Michael Broers, ‘Napoleon, his empire, our
Europe and the new Napoleonic history’, in Michael Broers, Peter Hicks, and Augustín
Guimerá, eds., The Napoleonic empire and the new European political culture (Basingstoke, ),
pp. –; and Michael Broers, Steven Englund, Michael Rowe, and Annie Jourdan,
‘Napoléon et l’Europe: le point de vue Anglo-Américan’, Annales Historiques de la Révolution
Française,  (), pp. –.
 Michael Broers, ‘Cultural imperialism in a European context? Political culture and cul-
tural politics in Napoleonic Italy’, Past and Present,  (), pp. –.
 Steven Englund, ‘Monstre sacré: the question of cultural imperialism and the Napoleonic
empire’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –.
 Broers, Europe under Napoleon, – (London, ), pp. – and ch. ; and idem,
‘The myth and reality of Italian regionalism: a historical geography of Napoleonic Italy, –
’, American Historical Review,  (), pp. –.
 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in world history: power and the politics of differ-
ence (Princeton, NJ, ), pp. –.
 Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a
theory of collaboration’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the theory of imperialism
(London, ), pp. –, esp. p. ; this view remains inﬂuential with a number of recent
studies of empire; see John Darwin, Unﬁnished empire and the global expansion of Britain (London,
), pp. –; andmore idiosyncratically Gregory A. Barton, Informal empire and the rise of one
world culture (Basingstoke, ).
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Cooper. There was an inherent danger that by assimilating northern Italians
excessively into the imperial hierarchy they could de-rail the Napoleonic state’s
‘progressive crusade’ for their own ends. Collaboration partnerships were
never supposed to be equal relationships, and delegating too much authority
to Milanese and Bolognese ofﬁcials was fraught with risks. As Alice Conklin
has shown elsewhere, collaboration was hardly ﬁxed in nature and was repack-
aged as imperial priorities mutated. The ﬂuctuating position and divisions
among indigenous supporters, within the French Imperium, gave raise to
several unexpected problems.
Michael Rowe’s study of the Napoleonic Rhineland and a number of area-
speciﬁc studies on collaboration have done much to counteract a past tendency
to dismiss the German, Italian, and Dutch ‘Jacobins’ who greeted favourably
France’s revolutionary, and later Napoleon’s conquering, armies. T. C.W.
Blanning, paraphrasing Churchill, summed this up: ‘rarely in the ﬁeld of histor-
ical scholarship has so much attention been lavished by so many on so few’.
He is correct that the Andreas Hofmanns, Pieter Vreedes, or the unhinged
Antonio Ranzas of this world were few and far between in number. Yet it
could be argued that to restrict collaborators to a fervently committed minority
of revolutionary or Napoleonic fanatics reduces and distorts the signiﬁcance of
this complex social grouping. The non-French Napoleonic collaborator was
propelled by a mixture of motivations and complete ideological commitment
was decidedly rare.
Many showed great reluctance when it came to imperial service and assisted
the empire as opportunistic, often unenthusiastic, converts who wanted to reap
the beneﬁts that imperial rule brought in terms of investment, law, order, and
patronage. Among their number were ancien régime public servants, lawyers/
 Frederick Cooper and Laura Stole, eds., Tensions of empire: colonial culture in a bourgeois
world (Los Angeles, CA, ), p. .
 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in question: theory, knowledge, history (Los Angeles, CA, ),
p. ; a view he later reﬁned, stating that all empires had ‘to ﬁnd a balance between the poles
of incorporation (the empire’s claim that different subjects belonged within the empire) and
differentiation (the empire’s claim that different subjects should be governed differently) was a
matter of dispute and shifting strategies’. Indeed, the Napoleonic empire was equally caught in
the maelstrom created by these centripetal and centrifugal forces. See Cooper, Colonialism in
question, p. .
 Alice L. Conklin, A mission to civilize: the republican idea of empire in France and West Africa,
– (Stanford, CA, ), pp. – and –.
 Michael Rowe, From Reich to state: the Rhineland in the revolutionary age, –
(Cambridge, ), pp. – and ch. ; Michael Rowe, ed., Collaboration and resistance in
Napoleonic Europe: state-formation in an age of upheaval, c. – (Basingstoke, ),
pp. –; Umberto Caldora, Calabria napoleonica, – (Naples, ); Miguel Artola,
Los Afrancesados (Madrid, ); and Jean-Marc Lafon, L’Andalousie et Napoléon: contre-insurrec-
tion, collaboration et résistances dans le midi de l’Espagne, – (Paris, ), esp. ‘Sociologie
de la collaboration andalouse’.
 Timothy Blanning, Joseph II (London, ), p. ; and his earlier ‘German Jacobins and
the French Revolution’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –.
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togati, absolutist reformers, and magnates who recognized in the Napoleonic
regime many of the features and values that they had supported under the pre-
vious administration. For instance, Milanese patricians such as Francesco Melzi
d’Eril and Carlo Verri (brother of the more famous Pietro) had matured under
the reforming culture of Joseph II’s enlightened absolutism and they found
afﬁnities with the new regime. They served not out of a personal loyalty to
Napoleon, but out of a long-held sense of devotion to the reforming state.
These men were extremely different in both outlook and behaviour from the
Giacobini who had supported the French since .
The relationship between the imperial centre and its more enthusiastic
Italian supporters was characterized by signiﬁcant ‘mistranslation’. The emper-
or’s directives and policies were at times genuinely misunderstood by Italians
who had not experienced the turmoil of the s in France. More often,
former Jacobins deliberately distorted orders from the centre, to suit individual
and local circumstances. For example, many Italian urban ofﬁcials, especially
disappointed Jacobins/patriots, continued to hope against all odds that
French hegemony might restore some of the autonomies and privileges that
their municipality had lost during the settecento riformatore. To maintain indigen-
ous support, the empire fed and manipulated such misunderstandings.
Throughout this period, imperial patronage vacillated between Melzi’s
Josephists and former Giacobini.
For their part, local collaborators hoped that they could redirect the
resources and prestige of the centre to the beneﬁt of their periphery. They
hoped that interaction with Napoleon’s empire would not just bring advantages,
wealth, and promotion but also settle old scores. For former Giacobini, using
the power of the empire to surpass and outperform rivals was perhaps the
most enticing feature of these collaborative networks. They hoped that the
empire would bring promotions and expected, often in vain, that it would
resolve long-standing disputes that the ancien régime had singularly failed to
address in their favour.
Essentially, ancien régime identities, local interests, and Napoleonic reforms
made collaboration a volatile compound. Persuading such diverse social
groups to work together could never be deﬁned through a precise formula.
Partnership with indigenous elites was a delicate set of compromises, which
even the smallest alteration could unsettle. Simplistically speaking, new admin-
istrative elites and old aristocracies, at times, found themselves at odds with their
 See Francesco Melzi d’Eril [great grandson], Francesco Melzi d’Eril, –: milanese
scomodo e grande uomo di stato, visto da un lontano pronipote (Florence, ), esp. –; and
Nino del Bianco, Francesco Melzi d’Eril: la grande occasione perduta, gli albori dell’indipendenza nel-
l’italia napoleonica (Milan, ), passim.
 Broers, Europe under Napoleon, –, pp. –; Gabriel Lovett, Napoleon and the
birth of modern Spain ( vols., New York, NY, ), II, pp. –; and John Dunne, ‘Power
on the periphery: elite–state relations in the Napoleonic empire’, in Alan Forrest and Philip
Dwyer, eds., Napoleon and his empire (Basingstoke, ), pp. –.
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French imperial overlords, while at other junctures, they were content to
beneﬁt from reforms and new institutions. However, such a picture is too
neat as it implies that collaborators shared the same interests and motivations.
As will become apparent, they were far from being socially harmonious. The
twin policies of amalgame and ralliement hid from view the centre’s difﬁculties
in promoting networks of amity.Napoleonic imperialism, especially in the sat-
ellite kingdoms, was a somewhat ﬂoundering attempt to create what David
Cannadine elsewhere has called Ornamentalism. The empire could not rely
exclusively on coercion. The emperor and his administrators fostered, as
much as possible, a shared sense of afﬁnity with indigenous elites. The satellite
kingdoms made the French empire poly-nuclear rather than absolutely centri-
petal in nature.
Many methodologies have been applied to the study of Napoleonic collabor-
ation. These include prosopography, anthropology, and archaeology. These are
all tools that have proﬁted scholars of nineteenth-century European imperial-
ism and have shown every sign of being equally useful to historians of
Napoleonic Europe. The most difﬁcult area remains ‘intermediate history’
or the attempt to link ‘micro’ or local events in the periphery with the
‘macro’ context of empire. From this perspective, the increasingly forgotten
art of micro-history could make an original contribution to the issue of
collaboration.
Famously, Carlo Ginzburg, followed by many others, in the s pioneered a
new approach to history which focused on archival cases-studies that were both
individual and local. At its heart, ‘micro-history’ examines trials, local
conﬂicts, and extraordinary incidents. From very speciﬁc cases, this mode of his-
torical analysis draws out broader social and cultural trends. It seeks to gauge
what such extraordinary events reveal about the norms and power structures
of the past societies in which they occurred. Francesca Trivellato has argued
recently that even in an age of global history the micro-historical is
 S. J. Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe (London, ), pp. –.
 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: how the British saw their empire (Oxford, ),
ch. . Invented traditions such as the ordre de la réunion and the proposed ordre des trois toisons
highlighted that the ‘European other’ was welcomed into the imperial fold if it shed unhealthy
past allegiances and embraced the new. Jean-Luc Stalins, Ordre impérial de la réunion (Paris,
); Emanuele Pigni, L’ordine della corona di ferro e le altre ricompense concesse da Napoleone I
nel regno italico (Milan, ); and Jean Joseph Taurignac, L’ordre impérial des trois toisons d’or
(Paris, ).
 Jean andMarie-José Tulard,Napoléon et quarante millions de sujets: la centralisation et le premier
empire (Paris, ).
 Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s satellite kingdoms: managing conquered peoples (Malabar, ).
 Broers, ‘Cultural imperialism in a European context?’, pp. –.
 Carlo Ginzburg, The cheese and the worms: the cosmos of a sixteenth-century miller (Baltimore,
MD, ). Recently, this approach has been question; see Jo Guldi and David Armitage,
The history manifesto (Cambridge, ), esp. pp. –.
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invaluable in unearthing connections between individuals and transnational
networks.Micro-history by its very nature deals with events that are exception-
al. This is its great strength as a heuristic device. It is only when the political,
social, and cultural norms of society are thrown into ﬂux that mechanisms of
power emerge from the shadows and become visible. Consequently, trials, scan-
dals, gossip, and other bizarre events have immense revelatory potential.
One suspects that micro-history as an approach has much to recommend it to
the Napoleonic scholar. There were no shortages of incidents, scandals, and
affairs during these momentous ﬁfteen years. It is this author’s very good
fortune to have unearthed one such incident that sheds new light on the phe-
nomenon of collaboration in Napoleonic Italy. The Oppizzoni affair erupted
onto the political scene in  and caused a huge headache for the imperial
administrators in Napoleonic Italy. Though mentioned en passant in the work of
Thiers, Beseghi, Antonelli, and Varni, no historian has examined this episode in
detail. This is remarkable considering that the trial records comprise over
, manuscript folios (luckily they escaped the bombing of Milan’s state
archives in ). Excitingly, the papers were still sealed when I ﬁrst con-
sulted them. Equally, Cardinal Oppizzoni’s voluminous private papers are still
housed today in Bologna’s archiepiscopal archives. Therefore, the speciﬁc
micro-history discussed in the second half of this article has the beneﬁt of
being remarkably well documented, and takes the reader to the very heart of
the problems that faced Napoleonic collaboration networks.
I I
Bologna, like so many Italian cities, has a complex local history. As the site of the
ﬁrst university in Europe, the relationship between ‘town and gown’ would
inﬂuence deeply the city’s urban development during the medieval period.
Subsequently, the defeat of the Bentivoglio family and the conquest of the
city by Julius II meant that the church would recreate the political, cultural,
 Francesca Trivellato, ‘Is there a future for Italian microhistory in the age of global
history?’, Californian Italian Studies,  (), pp. –.
 Adolphe Thiers,Histoire du consulat et de l’empire: faisant suite à l’histoire de revolution française
( vols., Paris, –), XII, p. ; Umberto Beseghi, I tredici cardinali Neri (Florence, ),
pp. –; Livio Antonelli, I prefetti dell’Italia napoleonica (Bologna, ), pp. –; and
Angelo Varni, Bologna napoleonica: potere e società dalla Repubblica cisalpina al regno d’Italia
(Bologna, ), pp. –.
 Archivio di Stato di Milano (ASMi), Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Processo
detto di Bologna.
 Archivio Arcivescovile di Bologna (AAB), Fondo Oppizzoni, Cartella ; and Mario Fanti,
‘Documentazione di età napoleonica nell’Archivio generale arcivescovile di Bologna’, in
Angelo Varni, ed., I ‘Giacobini’ nelle legazioni: gli anni napoleonici a Bologna e Ravenna ( vols.,
Bologna, ), II, pp. –.
 Luigi Simeoni and Albano Sorbelli, Storia della Università di Bologna ( vols., Bologna,
–), II, pp. –.
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and economic topography of the city in its own image. By , the archdio-
cese comprised  cathedral chapters,  parishes ( intra-muros), and no
fewer than  monasteries. Comparatively, in Bologna the ratio of religious to
lay inhabitants was  to  whereas in Milan it was  to .
The Sistine decrees of  established a senate and other political institu-
tions to administer the citizenry. This charter established the basic constitu-
tional framework under which the municipality was governed for almost
three centuries. The papal legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna, not to
mention their fertile countryside, were among the most economically signiﬁ-
cant provinces of the patrimony of St Peter. The papal legates, despite their
bad nineteenth-century reputation, ruled these provinces with a light touch
and local autonomies, especially in the realm of taxation, were respected if
hardly relished by St Peter’s successors.
Traditional and popular histories of the city characterize the eighteenth
century as a time of stagnation. Such a vision is not entirely fair given that
even the papal states could hardly remain immune from the enlightened re-
formism that was taking place in Lombardy, Tuscany, and Modena. Under
Benedict XIV and Pius VI, signiﬁcant, though slow, judicial, economic, and
ﬁscal reforms were taking place. Certainly, Bologna was not a place of oppor-
tunity for young men and mid-grade administrative personnel. Political power
was shared between a cardinal legate and a senate composed of ﬁfty aristocrats.
This elite constituted a tiny minority in a city of , inhabitants (half the size
of Milan). The senatorial oligarchy, supported by private policemen/thugs,
known as sbirri, did their best to resist central authority’s incursions into the mu-
nicipal administration. Attempts by the criminal court, the Tribunale del
Torrone, to pursue modernized rather than patrimonial forms of justice met
with violence. Indeed, a number of reformist magistrates were dispatched
with harquebus shots while conducting criminal prosecutions.
The arrival of the French in  must have built up expectations amongst
the educated bureaucratic milieu of this city. On his arrival, General
 Aldo Berselli and Angelo Varni, eds., Storia di Bologna: Bologna in età contemporanea, IV
(Bologna, ), pp. –.
 Ivana Pederzani, Un ministero per il culto: Giovanni Bovara e la riforma della chiesa in età napo-
leonica (Milan, ), pp. –; Ugo Da Como, Atti delle assemblee costituzionali italiane (Rome,
), p. ; Filiberto Agostini, La riforma napoleonica della chiesa nella repubblica e nel regno
d’Italia, – (Vicenza, ), pp. –.
 Giancarlo Angelozzi and Cesarina Casanova, La giustizia criminale in una città di antico
regime: il tribunale del torrone di Bologna secc. XVI–XVII (Bologna, ), pp. –.
 M. S. Anderson, ‘The Italian reformers’, in Derek Beales and Hamish Scott, eds.,
Enlightened absolutism: reform and reformers in later eighteenth-century Europe (London, ),
pp. –.
 Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment, pp. –.
 Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone, pp. – and –.
 Giancarlo Angelozzi and Cesarina Casanova, La giustizia criminale a Bologna nel XVIII secolo e
le riforme di Benedetto XIV (Bologna, ), passim.
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Bonaparte hinted that Bologna might expect a restoration of the medieval
Libertas it had lost in . The ﬁrst modern Italian constitution was proclaimed
in the Cathedral of St Petronius. Brieﬂy, from  April to  July , the city
was the capital of the short-lived Cispadane Republic. Many students, lawyers,
and minor aristocrats greeted the French enthusiastically as they saw opportun-
ities for advancement and adventure in the new republican regime. The Circolo
Costituzionale of Bologna was a decided breeding ground for future Napoleonic
collaborators. The subsequent incorporation of these lands into the larger
Cisalpine Republic was something that deeply irked Bolognese sensibility and
ignited a rivalry with Milanese elites. Equally, the peasantry of the surrounding
countryside and even the artisanal workers of the city showed themselves little
enthused by their new masters, who quickly made signiﬁcant demands in
terms of taxation and requisitions.
The re-conquest of Bologna in , and the subsequent  revolts of the
Bolognese, were a turbulent period for the city and revealed that its loyalty
could not be taken for granted. Yet, by the time Napoleon transformed his
Italian client republic into his ﬁrst satellite kingdom in , much had been
done to promote harmony in the department of the Reno, of which Bologna
was the administrative centre. The city was made the institutional seat of the
University, National Institute, Academy of Fine Arts, and Collegio dei Dotti.
With the incorporation of the Venetian departments into the client state, in
years following the battle of Austerlitz, Bologna now found itself on a central
artery that linked Milan and Venice to the rest of the triskelion-shaped northern
Italian kingdom. With the forced retirement of Melzi in , Bolognese
elites now occupied the pinnacle of society in the new kingdom. The secretary-
ship of state, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian grandmastership
of the horse, and the position of the cardinal archbishop of Milan were all
ofﬁces held by Emilian collaborators of Napoleon. Yet this appearance of
success and growing importance hid from sight lingering jealousy and
resentments.
It was some weeks after the battle of Austerlitz that events of the micro- and
local history in question began. January  was a particularly busy period for
the surgeon Gaetano Gozzi. He was charged ofﬁcially, by the prefectural police,
with ministering medical treatments to the workers of several tolerated brothels
 Berselli and Varni, eds., Storia di Bologna, pp. –.
 Umberto Marcelli, Il Gran circolo costituzionale e il Genio democratico, – ( vols.,
Bologna, ).
 Varni, Bologna napoleonica, pp. –.
 Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone, pp. – and –.
 Emanuele Pagano, Enti locali e stato in Italia sotto Napoleone: repubblica e regno d’Italia, –
 (Milan, ), pp. –.
 Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone, pp. –.
 Ibid.
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of Bologna. Following the legacy of enlightened absolutism, the French
empire had sought to regulate and limit the health hazards that followed in
prostitution’s wake with unprecedented vigour. The therapies designed to
cure venereal disease in the early nineteenth century were decidedly unpleas-
ant, requiring the administration of mercury to the affected areas. On this
dark night, Gozzi was summoned by a mistress of a brothel called Maria
Cenasi (also lovingly known as the ‘Diavoletta’ or little-she-devil). One of her
girls, the fourteen-year-old Anna Naldi, a recent recruit to her profession,
had contracted gonorrhoea and required medical attention. The surgeon
Gozzi obedient to his medical vocation started treating his patient. As the girl
cried in agony her mind must have strayed to the potential culprits who had
bestowed this horrid afﬂiction.
As the pain became unbearable, she suddenly screamed in a loud voice,
‘damn those red socks and that crimson skull cap’. Initially, Gozzi did not
think to enquire as to her meaning and merely suspected she was euphemizing.
But, as proceedings continued, he realized that her words were intended to
allude to the identity of a speciﬁc individual. The surgeon, curious as any
man in his position would be, asked the girl to explain herself. She answered
nonchalantly ‘I mean the boss of the city’s priests.’ Within days, rumours
started to circulate throughout the city that Cardinal Oppizzoni, the archbishop
of Bologna, had ‘deﬂowered’ an adolescent girl and induced her into a life of
prostitution.
Oppizzoni was one of Napoleon’s most favoured prelates and an ecclesiastical
high-ﬂyer. He had possessed the enviable ability, aided by his aristocratic birth
as the son of a Milanese count, to be not only in the right place at the right time
but, more importantly, he had proved remarkably versatile when it came to pol-
itics. Through his Greppi, Trivulzio, and Barbiano di Belgiojoso cousins he was
related to many of the enlightened aristocrats who had sought to push forward
Joseph II’s programme of reform. As archpriest of the Duomo (Cathedral) of
Milan he had welcomed the French invaders. During the negotiations at the
‘Comices de Lyon’, which created the Italian Republic (–), he had
been the archbishop of Milan Cardinal Visconti’s deputy. The sudden death
 Sara Accorsi and Anna Natali, Salariate dell’amore: storie e faccendi meretrici nell’Ottocento bol-
ognese (Bologna, ), pp. –; and Maurizio Garuti and Anna Natali, Amori illeciti nella
legazione pontiﬁcia di Bologna (Bologna, ), pp. –.
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Atti Originali, Doc. , Adi  marzo
, Witness statement of Gaetano Gozzi.
 Joan Sherwood, Infection of the innocents: wet nurses, infants, and syphilis in France, –
(Montreal, ), pp. –.
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Atti Originali, Doc. , Adi  marzo
, Witness statement of Gaetano Gozzi, fo. .
 Danilo Marrara, Ceti dirigenti municipali in Italia e in Europa in età moderna e contemporanea
(Pisa, ), p. ; Anon., Applausi poetici a S. E.za. Rev.ma. il Sig Carlo Oppizzoni in occasione del
suo ritorno dalla Francia (Bologna, ); M. Petrocchi, La restaurazione romana (Florence,
); Ugo Da Como, I comizi nazionali a Lione ( vols., Rome, –).
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of the latter during the banquet, held in honour of Italian deputies, meant that
the young archpriest was thrust into the limelight and took over from his dead
patron.
He showed himself a reliable and pliant ecclesiastical client of France. He
approved the repressive organic laws intended to supervise the activities of
the church (which Rome subsequently disavowed) and voted for Napoleon to
become president of the Italian Republic. Two years later, he was a senior
member of the team which, under Cardinal Caprara’s stewardship, negotiated
the Italian Concordat of . His accommodating stance before his French
masters paid dividends. In , he was made archbishop of Bologna and in
, received the cardinal’s galero, which, at the age of thirty-ﬁve, was an im-
pressive achievement.He was also made amember of the corpo legislativo in the
same year, which effectively made him a member of Napoleon’s Italian parlia-
ment. Such eminent ecclesiastical friends were literally a godsend to the
Napoleonic regime. Oppizzoni’s adherence to the kingdom of Italy had little
ideological content and mainly sought to promote harmonious relations
between church and state.
This crucial clerical collaborator was the man whom the young Anna Naldi
accused of being the source of her venereal afﬂiction. The surgeon, Gozzi,
decided to bring the matter to the attention of the city’s police. These
ofﬁcials in turn made very far from discreet enquiries and gave the impression
that they were preparing a prosecution against this prince of the church.
Subsequent trial proceedings highlight how outbursts of laughter and loud
jocular discussions in their headquarters alerted many passers-by that some-
thing unusual was afoot. The records demonstrate that in an age when news-
papers were heavily censored, word of mouth and rumour proved very effective
media for the dissemination of, admittedly, unreliable information. Thanks to
the city’s many taverns, especially the seediest den, the hostelry of the Three
Hunchbacks, the cardinal’s sexual proclivities were debated keenly.
Bizarrely, no one questioned why the prelate had chosen a rather downmarket
prostitute in fragile health rather selecting a healthy, witty, and high-
 Arru, Concordato Italiano del , pp. – and .
 He would hold both of these positions until his death in , and would quell no fewer
than two revolutions in his diocese. G. Natali, Il cardinale Oppizzoni legato a latere per le quattro lega-
zioni dal  marzo al  maggio  (Bologna, ).
 Roberti, Milano capitale napoleonica, I, p. .
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Atti Originali, Doc. ,  marzo ,
Witness statement of Giovanni Francesco Da Vita, fos. –. This witness ﬁrst heard rumours
of the Oppizzoni affair in the public house (Bottega) run by Tommaso Pirotti. He names
twelve individuals who discussed this case and describes how it spread by word of mouth to
the nearby Caffè degli Stelloni and then further aﬁeld; and Doc. ,  marzo ,
Witness statement of Gaetano Zurla, fos. –. This testimony conﬁrms that police laughter
and jocularity over the affair alerted local residents that something was afoot.
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Atti Originali, Doc. ,  marzo ,
Witness statement of Tommaso Mezzopiede Parroco di S Benedetto, fo. .
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maintenance courtesan instead. Almost immediately, songs, ballads, and
modiﬁed versions of the psalms describing the cardinal’s over-zealous care of
the souls entrusted to him were in circulation. Oppizzoni realized that the situ-
ation was untenable.
At nightfall, the cardinal packed his bags and headed for the imperial palace
at Monza. The viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais, was more than a little surprised
to be roused by the cardinal in a state of great nervous excitement. He stated
that he had been slandered, and refused to return to Bologna until his name
was cleared and his innocence vindicated. Eugène promised every support
but, true to his step-father’s instructions, contacted Paris. The emperor’s gut re-
sponse showed that he had a rather minimalist approach when it came to child
protection:
I am surprised and angry about what has happened to the archbishop of Bologna.
Write to the prefect, if this affair is still kicking up trouble, have the girl and her pro-
curess locked up in Bicêtre. Translate this term into a Milanese equivalent. Tell him
that I honour the Cardinal Oppizzoni and that I have no intention that a go-between
and a girl will compromise such a respectable person, even if in truth hemay have his
weaknesses. There is no question of this.
The emperor’s reference to Bicêtre (a borstal in Paris for young offenders)
highlights he was thinking in decidedly French terms. He wanted to defuse
the situation with a light custodial punishment for Anna Naldi. This is a good
example of ‘mistranslation’, where the centre issued commands that were cul-
turally speciﬁc, and fundamentally misunderstood the Italian context. A light
touch à la française in this affair was not going to resolve the issue. Three
weeks later the situation showed absolutely no sign of abating. Napoleon
wrote more than a little irked that:
If Cardinal Oppizzoni is innocent, the injury visited on him demands vengeance; if
instead he is guilty the circumstance is no less serious. Talk on my behalf to the car-
dinal; make him aware of my opinion in this matter, if the allegation is true, I still
hold the administration of Bologna guilty [of being indiscreet], and if the facts
are false, exemplary punishment must be meted out. If, in fact the accusation is
not true, order the prostitute, her procuress and the man who impersonated the car-
dinal to be arrested, and give great éclat to this infamous affair; but you must be ab-
solutely sure of the facts.
One suspects that Napoleon, with his rather low estimation of human nature,
thought that there was no smoke without a ﬁre. The emperor wanted a cover
up only if the facts went against the cardinal. It was inconceivable that a
 Cf. Erica-Marie Benabou, La prostitution et la police des moeurs au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, );
and Nina Kushner, Erotic exchanges: the world of elite prostituion in eighteenth-centry Paris (London,
).
 Napoléon Bonaparte, Correspondance générale, No. ,  mars , VI, p. .
 Ibid., No. ,  mars , VI, pp. –.
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fourteen-year-old prostitute could compromise a man perched at the summit of
the Catholic hierarchy. After all, the emperor had stated that ‘bishops were
merely prefects with red socks’, that is, they like bureaucrats were state
ofﬁcials. In this respect, he showed a fundamental misunderstanding of reli-
gion, typical of post-revolutionary French mind-sets. Catholic religious issues, es-
pecially those relating to clergymen, could not be tackled solely through secular
means.
The cardinal, after receiving further reassurances by the viceroy, became de-
cidedly over-conﬁdent. He wrote to Rome an emotional letter asking what he
should do if those who had sullied his name were condemned to death. The car-
dinal secretary of state Consalvi replied in the following, chilling, manner:
If this is the case [that those guilty of slandering you are condemned to execution]
your eminence will behave in the conciliatory manner of the good shepherd and will
make overtures that the accused be saved from the death penalty. If his pastoral
ofﬁces fail to be effective his eminence will have played a role above reproach and
his conduct, on the contrary, will be considered praiseworthy by all.
There was something of the surreal in these daydreams shared between clergy-
men, who ignored how French penal legislation since the s tended towards
leniency in cases of injurious speech, calumny, libel, and slander. Most
damaging of all, the cardinal was handicapped by the fact that Rome had
never recognized ofﬁcially the state’s criminal jurisdiction over clergymen.
Therefore, Oppizzoni refused to have any direct role in his own trial. This
meant that the judicial authorities of the Italian kingdom were expected to
conduct a prosecution for slander when nobody ofﬁcially would appear in
court claiming to have been injured or libelled.
Meanwhile, elsewhere, events were taking an unexpected turn. Late on the
evening of  February , the sentries at the city gates of Bologna did not
anticipate further activity. This largely explains why they were taken by surprise
when an ofﬁcial government carriage carrying Giovanni Villa, the undersecre-
tary of state for police, arrived in the city. This ofﬁcial’s ﬁrst port of call was
the barracks of the local gendarmerie (military police). Here, armed with a min-
isterial letter conferring unlimited powers to execute his secret mission, he
ordered that Colonel Zanetti place at his immediate disposal two armed gen-
darmes in civilian dress.
 John Martin Robinson, Cardinal Consalvi, – (London, ); and Ercole
Cardinal Consalvi, Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi ( vols., Paris, ), I, pp. –.
 AAB, Fondo Oppizzoni, Cartella , Fasc. , Doc. ,  aprile , fos. –.
 See § , ‘Calomnies, injures, révélations des secrets’, in Code pénal (Paris, ),
pp. –; and for a broader survey, see Charles Walton, Policing public opinion in the French
Revolution: the culture of calumny and the problem of free speech (Oxford, ), pp. – and
–.
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Processo detto di Bologna da riporsi in
Archivio, Doc. ,  marzo , Villa’s Report to Guicciardi, fos. –.
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Thus, in the company of these two military policemen, he proceeded to the
prefecture. Here, he informed the astounded prefect Teodoro Somenzari that
he was ordered by Diego Guicciardi, the director general of police, to conﬁscate
all papers relating to the Oppizzoni affair. Initially, the prefect panicked and
claimed to be unable to locate the key to the strongbox containing these
papers. Villa insisted and the ﬁles were eventually surrendered into his
custody. He then visited Luigi Valdrighi, an eminent jurist who, at this time,
was president of the court of appeal of Bologna, and informed him that he
was to begin instantly an investigation into the police’s activities against the car-
dinal. He then took Anna Naldi and her procuress, the elderly Maria Benetti,
into custody and transferred them to the more secure prison of Monza near
Milan.
Soon after Villa’s return to Milan, the prefectural police of Bologna was dis-
banded and reorganized. The former head of police Giulio Ceregalli and his
secretary Andrea Rasinelli were placed under house arrest. The prefect was
recalled to Milan, where he was to account for his conduct before the
viceroy. In the meantime, Valdrighi set about the task of uncovering what the
police had been up to over the previous two months. While, on the face of it,
it seemed that Ceregalli and his subordinates had merely initiated proceedings
against Anna Naldi for libelling the archbishop of the city, soon a more complex
and disturbing reality was uncovered. Doctor Gaetano Caneti, a disbarred and
rather shady lawyer, had acted as notary during the interrogations undertaken
by the police. He was immediately arrested and bullied into a confession.
After some weeks in prison, and fearing for his future, he made some startling
revelations. He alleged that the papers conﬁscated from the prefect repre-
sented only a fraction of the depositions actually recorded. He afﬁrmed that
he had personally witnessed Rasinelli burning the greater part of the ofﬁcial
records in order to cover his tracks. It was alleged that pressure had been
put on the witnesses to identify the cardinal and that witness statements had
been deliberately modiﬁed so that they corroborated Naldi’s accusations. To
president Valdrighi’s increasing concern, a conspiracy seemed to emerge in
which the prefect had instructed, or at least turned a blind eye to, his police’s
inept attempts to ensnare the cardinal in a sexual scandal. The local constabu-
lary seemed to be guilty, at the least, of having abused their authority, if not of
criminal conspiracy.
Equally worrying for Valdrighi was the growing evidence that the friends and
family of the ofﬁcers in question were putting pressure on the witnesses not to
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Ibid., Doc. ,  mai , Guicciardi to Luosi.
 Ibid., No. , ‘Rapporto concernente tutte le indagini fatte e deposizioni assunte dalla dir-
ezione di Polizia generale per mettere nella possibile maggior luce l’affare che motivò il
riclamo del Sig Cardinale Oppizzoni.’
 Ibid., No. , parte II and III.
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give evidence against their kin. For the government in Milan, it became neces-
sary for proceedings to be transferred to more neutral ground. Within days, the
papers of the trial and the former police of Bologna were heading in the direc-
tion of the state prisons in Milan. A very alarming situation was arising, which
had the potential of bringing into disrepute the law enforcement system in
the Italian kingdom. Those who had pursued Oppizzoni found themselves
the victims of their unsolicited zeal.
The other protagonist of this affair was the prefect Teodoro Somenzari.
Unlike Oppizzoni, he had been among the most zealous supporters of the
French invasion during the late s and a prominent Italian Jacobin.
Although of Mantuan birth, he had left his native city and joined forces with
the radicals of Bologna. Indeed, he was a friend and client of none other
than the prominent Bolognese radical Antonio Aldini, who in  had been
appointed secretary of state for the kingdom of Italy. Somenzari was a compe-
tent administrator, who quickly rose through the ranks. Having said this, his
ascent had been interrupted brieﬂy in  when he became an Austrian pris-
oner during the brief Habsburg re-conquest of northern Italy. He spent at
least six months in the decidedly unpleasant Austro-Croatian fortress of
Bocche di Cataro (present-day Boka Kotorska in Croatia). One can speculate
reasonably that during his detention his hatred of the ancien régime aristocracy
and religious establishment sharpened.
In many ways, the future Somenzari–Oppizzoni rivalry mirrored (or was a
more intense and localized version of) the Aldini–Melzi split which had blighted
the summit of the northern Italian satellite state. All these men, on the surface
at least, collaborated with the French empire, but they did so for vastly different
reasons. The ‘ancien régime heritage’ and ‘reluctance’ of Melzi–Oppizzoni bore
little similarity to the more ideological ‘republican-liberal apprenticeship’ and
‘mistranslations’ of Somenzari–Aldini. Milanese aristocrats sought to promote
civil order and administrative rationalization. Former Jacobin Bolognese togati
wished to improve the lot of their native town and gain power at the expense
of the old nobility. The biggest ‘mistranslation’ between ruler and ruled sur-
rounded the objective of mobilizing different types of Italians to work in part-
nership for the beneﬁt of the empire. This policy, known as amalgam, sought
to fuse collaborators into a new working composite elite. Even in
Metropolitan France, these attempts to forge masses of granite delivered de-
cidedly mixed results. The conﬂict in Rouen between Cardinal Étienne
Hubert de Cambacérès and Jacques Claude Beugnot, the prefect of Seine
Inférieure, in many ways (excluding the sexual element) mirrored the
 Antonelli, I prefetti dell’Italia napoleonica, pp. – and –.
 Livio Antonelli, ‘Antonio Aldini e la segreteria di stato a Parigi’, in Varni, ed., I ‘Giacobini’
nelle legazioni, II, pp. –.
 Emanuele Pagano, Alle origini della Lombardia contemporanea: il governo delle province lombarde
durante l’occupazione austro-russa, – (Milan, ).
 Cf. del Bianco, Francesco Melzi d’Eril, pp. –.
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Somenzari–Oppizzoni divide. Former revolutionary politicians and ancien
régime clerics found it immensely difﬁcult to establish cordial working relations.
Such rifts intensiﬁed beyond the Alps, as collaborators sought to manipulate the
empire to settle old scores with their traditional social and regional rivals.
On his release from Bocche di Cataro, Somenzari quickly became an execu-
tive commissioner, and in  was appointed prefect to the department of the
Reno, whose administrative capital was Bologna. He seemed the perfect man for
the job, having sufﬁciently radical credentials to appeal to his old Jacobin
friends in Bologna and determined enough to follow through on some substan-
tial budget cuts imposed by Milan.Despite being a Lombard, he made himself
popular by using local men in the administration and fraternizing amiably with
his subordinates, who also shared his radical career path from the triennio
Giacobino.
Alas, Oppizzoni, his counterpart with red socks, who had arrived at about the
same time, did not endear himself to either the city or its prefect. He was the
ﬁrst-non Bolognese archbishop in centuries, and he brought with him
Monsignor Pagani and other Milanese collaborators to help him manage the
archdiocese. More controversially, his ﬁrst priority, following government
orders, was the reduction of the number of urban parishes from ﬁfty-three to
eighteen. The civic and religious pride of his archdiocese was deeply
injured. The cardinal also had a marked dislike, on a personal level, for
Somenzari, whom he refused to meet socially. The prefect held monthly recep-
tions and banquets, which were well attended by the elites of Bologna. The
absence of the cardinal was a far from subtle snub.
This bad blood reached its zenith in December  when two Te Deums
were sung: one to celebrate the victory at Austerlitz and the other peace with
Austria. In the ﬁrst instance, the cardinal waited till the prefect was absent
from the city to hold this solemn ceremony. Thus, effectively he erased his
rival from the symbolic hierarchy of the city. Second time round, he could
not pull the same trick, but he had another up his sleeve. It had been usual
for the city’s authorities to have places of honour in the metropolitan cathedral
for major religious festivities. Somenzari arrived for the second Te Deum to ﬁnd
that no arrangements had been made to receive him and his prefectural staff.
Only the French ofﬁcers of the city’s garrison had had spaces reserved.
Intense dislike sharpened into searing hatred. It seems too much of a coinci-
dence that a few weeks later Anna Naldi came up with her story. Equally
 Gavin Daly, Inside Napoleonic France: state and society in Rouen, – (Aldershot,
), pp. – and –; and Étienne DeJean, Un préfet du consulat: Jacques-Claude Beugnot
(Paris, ), pp. –.
 Pagano, Enti locali e stato in Italia sotto Napoleone, pp. –.
 Varni, Bologna napoleonica, pp. –.
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Processo Contro gli Agenti di Polizia di
Bologna, Doc. ,  maggio , Witness statement Vincenzo Zabelli and Carlo Bettoni, 
maggio , Witness statement Canonico Giovanni Lucio Savioli.
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bizarre was the fact that the socks of Oppizzoni’s predecessor, Cardinal
Boncompagni, literally vanished from a second-hand clothes vendor around
the same time. The judges involved in the case wondered whether these
had been stolen by an individual linked to the prefect, in order to impersonate
and compromise Oppizzoni.
In all of this, one cannot help but feel a certain admiration for Anna Naldi.
Her story of clerical abuse was to cause a furore in Milan, Paris, and Rome.
Her tale resurrected the municipal rivalries between Milan and Bologna, the
hatred of former Jacobins against privileged noblemen. It pitted the state
against the church; equally, it made the position of Italy’s French imperial
masters very, very uncomfortable indeed. This was something of an achieve-
ment for a teenage girl disowned and abandoned by her family for having
started an unsuitable relationship with a papal sbirro in her youth. Was she a
clever liar who escaped harsh jail conditions by telling a lie that allowed the
prefect of the city to start a campaign aimed at besmirching his ecclesiastical
rival’s reputation? Or was she the pawn of larger conspiracy, on the part of
Bologna’s secular elites seeking to rid themselves of a troublesome priest? We
will never know the precise answer but her allegations of sexual misconduct cer-
tainly made the relationship between the empire and its collaborators tense for
much of .
By March, Napoleon and his administrators realized that they were being
forced to make a choice they had desperately hoped to avoid. Should they
support a collaborative prince of the church or a loyal functionary? The situ-
ation gained urgency as international circumstances took a decidedly unwel-
come turn. Papal neutrality during the previous military campaign against
Austria had antagonized Napoleon and he was on the verge of violating the sov-
ereignty of Rome. His troops were soon to march across the patrimony of St
Peter and were to occupy the port of Ancona, one of the most strategic locations
on the Adriatic. Diplomatic relations between Rome and the empire moved
from difﬁdent collaboration to outright hostility. The growing hostility
between church and state during the Napoleonic period, deﬁned as the ‘politics
of religion’, has been treated in great depth elsewhere.
Sufﬁce it to say that the emperor could not afford to lose the few friends he
had among the Catholic hierarchy. Equally, his power among the civil service in
 Ibid., maggio , Witness statement Teresa Franceschelli, owner of bottega nella via
Malcontenti.
 Ibid., Witness statement Antonia Bassi Tognina, prostitute colleague of Naldi.
 E. E. Hales, The emperor and the pope (New York, NY, ), pp. –.
 For the classic narrative, see Joseph Othenin Bernard de Cléron Cmte d’Haussonvile,
L’Église romaine et le premier empire, – ( vols., Paris, –), II, chs. XXII–XXVII.
 Jacques-Olivier Boudon, Napoléon et les cultes (Paris, ), pp. –; and Michael
Broers, The politics of religion in Napoleon Italy: the war against God, – (London,
), passim.
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northern Italy relied on competent and committed public servants, like
Somenzari. Much later in this affair he wrote to Eugène in the following terms:
My Son, treat well the patriots of Bologna and those whom you call the partisans of
Somenzari…In the gravest circumstances, the patriot party is the one which has
always shown itself to be most energetic in its support for France and the throne.
Public esteem is an empty word; listening to both parties [in this affair], shows
how ﬁckle it can be. Place yourself above petty prejudices and small mindedness.
This was a roundabout way of saying that ultimately an exit strategy needed to be
found. By the second half of the year, matters were not helped by the fact that
the trial against the police of Bologna was producing unexpected results. The
praetor (chief prosecutor) of Milan informed the government that in his
opinion the conviction of the four people in the dock – Anna Naldi, her procur-
ess, the chief of police and his secretary – was unlikely. His assessment proved
prophetic. The magistrates of Milan’s appeal court declared on  December
 that to their mind no abuses, short of errors of judgement, had been com-
mitted by the police and that any conviction for libel was unsafe without an
injured party. Therefore, all involved in the trial were acquitted. Oppizzoni’s
only consolation was to be found in the president of the court’s ﬁnal remark
that ‘it seems safe to conclude that it is morally impossible that the author of
the allegations in question was Cardinal [Oppizzoni]’. The attempt to keep
all sides of this complicated collaboration network on-board was to alienate
many members of this affair.
Somenzari, though innocent of any crime, was still guilty of misjudgement.
The government’s solution was to transfer him to the new, though decidedly
less important, Venetian department of the Passariano (Udine). Here he
had a successful career, which culminated in his ennoblement as a baron of
the kingdom of Italy. Having said this, he would never again be appointed to
a ﬁrst division prefecture like those of Milan, Venice, or Bologna. Essentially,
this affair transformed him from a stormtrooper of the empire into a profession-
al career-bureaucrat who kept his nose clean. From the ﬁnal judgement of
Milan’s appeal court, it could be concluded that the rule of law had triumphed
over arbitrary justice. Alas, the viceroy felt that it would be highly undesirable to
leave Anna Naldi and her associate at large. Therefore, using his sovereign
powers, he had these two women detained, without legal due process, for a
further year until the situation had quietened down.
The denouement of the Oppizzoni affair left a decidedly bitter taste for both
the government and its collaborators. The cardinal’s reputation had not
 Napoléon Bonaparte, Correspondance generale, No. ,  juillet , VI, p. .
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Giustizia Punitiva PM , Processo detto di Bologna da riporsi in
Archivio, No.  [Sentenza] Riservata No.  =  =  =  = e , Regno d’Italia Milano
 Xbre , Il Tribunale d’Appello del Dipartimento d’Olona.
 Antonelli, I prefetti dell’Italia napoleonica, p. .
 ASMi, Atti di Governo, Ufﬁci e Tribunali Regi , Somenzari ﬁle.
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received the public vindication he had been promised. Alienated from
Napoleon, he became the ﬁgurehead of the municipal opposition to French
rule in Bologna. In , he refused to attend Napoleon’s wedding to
Archduchess Marie Louise at Saint-Cloud. According to Umberto Beseghi,
Napoleon wanted to have him shot after he had done so much to protect his
reputation. Cooler counsels prevailed; Oppizzoni was deprived of his crimson
robes and became one of the thirteen opposition ‘black cardinals’ imprisoned
in different fortresses until .
The imperial government sought desperately to preserve its collaboration
networks, in Bologna, in , but found the path to achieving this objective
fraught with difﬁculties. Napoleon, Eugène, and their ministers showed them-
selves unsure of how to quench endogamous Italian rivalries and remain
aloof from such disputes. It is true that the government put little pressure on
the Italian judiciary, but the verdict of acquittal cannot have been very
welcome. It highlighted, and made visible, one of the problems Paris found
most intractable. Namely, a sense of impotence when it came to dealing with
and harnessing cultures of regional collaboration for the beneﬁt of the
empire. In the end, an increasingly bewildered Napoleon impotently turned
from Ornamentalism to Orientalism in the blink of an eye. In a letter to
Eugène, he could only lament: ‘Beware of the prattle of Italians. If the
prefect of Bologna is guilty he will be punished. Believe me Aldini is too
clever to write stupidities. The country in which you ﬁnd yourself is a land of
idle gossip.’ The frustration expressed here by Napoleon highlighted how
the difﬁculties of ruling a vast multi-national empire could prove insoluble.
Collaboration, no matter how desirable, was shipwrecked easily on the danger-
ous rocks of individual, competing and conﬂicting, interests. Governmental,
local, municipal, aristocratic, and radical agendas intersected in unpredictable
and uncontrollable ways in northern Italy.
The empire tried hard to accommodate the majority of the parties in the
Oppizzoni affair. It could be suggested that it worked hardest (perhaps unchar-
acteristically) in seeking to avoid alienating the ecclesiastical element in this
scandal. Several times the emperor hinted, with varying degrees of subtlety,
towards a cover-up as the only viable solution. Yet satisfying the expectations,
or rather the agendas, of native collaborators proved intractable. The prefect
had used (or at the very least encouraged his subordinates to use) the adminis-
trative apparatus at his disposal to damage his ancien régime/ecclesiastical/
 Varni, Bologna napoleonica, pp. –.
 Beseghi, I tredici cardinali, pp. –.
 Napoléon Bonaparte, Correspondance generale, No. ,  avril , VI, p. .
 Broers, The politics of religion, pp. –.
 Napoléon Bonaparte, Correspondance générale, No. , mars , VI, pp. –; and
ibid., Nos.  and , Paris,  avril , x, pp. – and esp. p. , ‘[a prelate] whom
I protected and whose sexual shenanigans I covered up by using my authority to interrupt the
course of criminal justice in Bologna’.
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regional rival. Government expressed deep concern over how the machinery of
the empire-state could be subverted by local elites for their own petty personal
designs.
The cardinal, for his part, descended on the viceregal court at Milan, like an
avenging fury, to defend his reputation and eliminate his prefectural and revo-
lutionary antagonist. This takes us to the heart of the question as both Cardinal
Oppizzoni and Prefect Somenzari were collaborators. Yet their engagement
with the centre was hardly one of passive ideological commitment. Their collab-
oration was founded on reluctance and mistranslating the imperial state’s
mission into more personal and regionalized terms that ﬁtted their own circum-
stances. They, ultimately, dragged their imperial overlord into a quarrel that was
alien to the evolving Napoleonic project. Collaborators were supposed to lubri-
cate nuts and bolts of government; here, instead, they sparked a serious break-
down in local administration.
For months, Bologna remained without its highest ofﬁcials and bereft of a
police force. According to Angelo Varni, crime increased during this interreg-
num. The collapse of order was the antithesis of French rule. Regional and
pre-Napoleonic identities were not only at the heart of this scandal, but had con-
stantly the potential of upsetting the delicate balances and partnerships created
by the empire. In many ways, both the empire and its Italian collaborators
picked up the pieces after . At times of crisis the secular administration,
and urban elites, of Bologna renewed their steadfastness to their French
masters. The  war against Austria led to a series of atavistic peasant insur-
rections throughout the satellite kingdom. When a large group of insurgents
appeared before the walls of Bologna, the prefecture, municipality, and nation-
al guard all solidly stood together to withstand a veritable siege. After the col-
lapse of the relations with the papacy, the imperial administration stood ﬁrmly
with the former ‘Giacobini’, and clerical collaboration largely evaporated.
The Napoleonic behemoth drastically redrew European borders, institutions,
and values. From , it had inherited a disdain for tradition and regional
diversity. The men it sought to co-opt in working for the grand imperial
design not only had a multiplicity of conﬂicting ambitions, but, even more im-
portantly, they had divergent pasts. The well-known policies of ralliement and
amalgame, which formed the basis of the compact at heart of imperial society,
 Varni, Bologna napoleonica, p. .
 Ibid.
 G. Natali, ‘L’insorgenza del  nel dipartimento del Reno’, Atti della regia depitazione di
storia per l’Emilia e la Romagna, anno XV, vol. II (/), pp. –; and, more generally,
Rinaldo Spadoni, Le Insorgenze contadine in Val Padane nel periodo napoleonico –
(Bologna, ), passim.
 Boudon, Napoléon et les cultes, pp. –.
 Woolf, Napoleon’s integration of Europe, pp. –.
 Michael Broers, ‘The Napoleonic empire’, in Alan Forrest and Peter Wilson, eds., The bee
and the eagle: Napoleonic France and the end of the Holy Roman Empire,  (Basingstoke, ),
pp. –.
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had been born as a speciﬁc means of healing the divisions of the revolutionary
decade in France. Only within the metropolis could these policies approach
success (and even here they were hardly guaranteed to function). As Howard
G. Brown has stated, ‘the ability to combine revolutionary winners and losers in
a semi-permanent political elite provided one of the key conditions of stability
under Napoleon’. Former ancien régime and revolutionary elites put the past
behind them (temporarily at least) in an attempt to get beyond the factional
turmoil and disorders of the s. Having lost so much in the revolutionary
maelstrom, French elites had everything to gain by working with a regime
founded on the selective oubli of the immediate past.
Beyond the Rhine, Pyrenees, and Alps, the situation was very different. The
traumas, divisions, and expectations of the populations conquered by the
French had little to do with revolutionary politics but everything to do with
local and atavistic forces. Prelates, Jacobins, aristocrats, lawyers, mayors, mer-
chants, and other groups may have played lip service to the rhetoric of amalgame
and ralliement but they could not straightforwardly translate these terms to ﬁt
their own context in a meaningful manner.
Even in the Napoleonic kingdom of northern and central Italy, one of the
success stories of the empire, the programme for creating a new composite col-
laborative elite ran into signiﬁcant difﬁculties. Bolognese collaborators were dis-
trustful of their Milanese counterparts whom Napoleon had unleashed on their
city. The promotion of Lombards, during –, to the highest summits of
the Italian satellite state was resented. Municipal loyalties were keenly felt,
allegiances toward the new polity were delicate at best. Amalgame beyond
the Alps could act as a social sledge hammer rather than a soldering iron.
Analogies can be found in Livio Antonelli’s study of the mixed results elicited
by the attempt to appoint Venetian prefects to Lombard and Emilian depart-
ments. Unlike their French masters, for whom the traumas of the s
had bred a desire to let bygones be bygones, northern Italians had long mem-
ories of distrust for each other, which could not be erased in a short space of
time. The imperial overlords, rather than settling such disputes, found them-
selves drawn by its collaborators into frightening vortices of localism. The cen-
trifugal forces of locality, municipality, and campanilismo had an iron grip on this
 Michael Broers, ‘The ﬁrst Napoleonic regime, –: the origins of the positivist
right or the zenith of Jacobinism?’, in Nicholas Atkin and Frank Tallett, eds., The right in
France from  to  (London, ), pp. –.
 Broers, The Napoleonic empire in Italy, –, pp. –.
 Howard Brown and Judith A. Miller, eds., Taking liberties: problems of a new order from the
French Revolution to Napoleon (Manchester, ), p. .
 Varni, Bologna napoleonica, pp. – and .
 Roberti, Milano capitale napoleonica, I, pp. , –.
 Broers, The Napoleonic empire in Italy, –, pp. –.
 Antonelli, I prefetti dell’Italia napoleonica, pp. –.
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corner of Italy, but one suspects that elsewhere in the empire much the same
thing was afoot.
The elites of Bologna were among the most devoted of Napoleon’s Italian
subjects. They often received positive mentions in dispatches and were com-
mended for their service. They patiently waited and hoped that their new gov-
ernors would reward them with power, prestige, and most importantly
autonomy. In , the grip on political power held by the Milanese began
to loosen when Melzi d’Eril was sidelined. The creation of the kingdom of
Italy gave the Bolognese some indications that the pendulum was swinging in
their favour. They scanned the sky for other encouraging omens and found
them. The new royal regime seemed to bring the greatest of all intoxicants:
possibility.
With unparalleled clumsiness, in  the prefect of the city, the local admin-
istration, the police, and even Aldini in Paris tried to pounce on their unwel-
come Milanese cardinal. One could speculate that they hoped that the
empire would bow to localistic rivalries. Instead, Napoleon and Eugène received
a terrifying lesson in the precariousness of collaboration networks and the
dangers of being reluctantly drawn into local politics. This case may be excep-
tional in the extent to which the prefect and his Bolognese supporters were pre-
pared to go to rid themselves of Oppizzoni but it exempliﬁes well the difﬁculties
of harnessing local support outside of the Metropole. Everywhere in Europe,
collaboration proved a double-edged sword. It was a necessary instrument for
governance but one that could be used by locals to redirect the empire’s
agenda.
 Zaghi, L’Italia di Napoleone, pp. –.
 Antonino de Francesco, L’Italia di Bonaparte: politica, statualità, e nazione nella penisola tra
due rivoluzioni, – (Turin, ), pp. –.
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